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IAC-D-57/63
17 May 1957


Post-Mortem on NIE 63.2-57:

The Prospects for North Vietnam,

dated 14 May 1957

I. Findings

1. There is no single subject of major concern with respect to North Vietnam on which adequate information is available. We must depend for material largely on the regime's radio and press.



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2. The following are examples of important intelligence gaps. We know almost nothing about the amounts and types of Bloc military support for the DRV or the extent to which Bloc military advisers are present in the military forces. We lack timely or adequate order of battle information. We know very little about the DRV decision-making apparatus or about its relation with the decision-making apparatus which determines over-all Bloc strategy and tactics. Our knowledge of internal conditions in North Vietnam or about the regime's control apparatus or objectives remains limited. Finally, there is a lack of intelligence on DRV strength in South Vietnam.

II. Action

The IAC agencies are requested to take appropriate action to correct the deficiencies noted in paragraph 2 above.

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